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visualize a threat to liberty in the action of a uniformed health inspector an-
swering a routine complaint. Yet in an era when politically controlled officials
have grown powerful through an ever increasing series of minor infractions of
civil liberties, it would seem prudent to invoke the full force of the constitu-
tional guarantees at every opportunity.30
DIVIDEND CREDITS FOR NONCUMIULATIVE
PREFERRED STOCK
In addition to seniority in the distribution of corporate earnings, the cumula-
tive preferred shareholder receives a credit for dividend arrearages accruing
when earnings are not sufficient to authorize distributions. Yet in some cir-
cumstances it may be undesirable to place the potential burden of such arrear-
ages upon the corporation. Upon reorganization or at the commencement of
ventures in which initial years of losses or low profits are anticipated, noncumu-
lative preferred may be a sounder issue. Such stock issues pose a fundamental
problem: do the noncumulative preferred shareholders receive a dividend credit
for those years when profits are legally adequate to permit some distribution
but the directors omit any declaration?
The United States Supreme Court rejected such a dividend credit for non-
cumulative preferred stock in Wabash Railway Co. v. Barclay., Speaking
through justice Holmes it asserted:
When a man buys stock instead of bonds he takes a greater risk in the business. No
one suggests that he has a right to dividends if there are no net earnings. But the in-
vestment presupposes that the business is to go on, and therefore even if there are net
earnings, the holder of stock, preferred as well as common, is entitled to have a divi-
dend declared only out of such part of them as can be applied to dividends consistently
with a wise administration of a going concern. When... the dividends in each fiscal
year were declared to be noncumulative and no net income could be so applied within
the fiscal year referred to in the certificate the right for that year was gone. If the
right is extended further upon some conception of policy, it is enlarged beyond the
meaning of the contract and the common and reasonable understanding of men.2
These arguments, in the context of the apparently plain meaning of "non-
cumulative" as against "cumulative," have prevailed in all jurisdictions except
New Jersey.3 The New Jersey position, first expressed in the Cast Iron Pipe
cases, 4 is based upon the belief that in the absence of a dividend credit there is
30 See DeVoto, Due Notice to the FBI, Harper's Magazine (Oct., 1949) at 65.
'28o U.S. 197 (1930).
2280 U.S. 197, 203 (1930).
3But writers have advocated various forms of the dividend credit. See Frey, The Dis-
tribution of Corporate Dividends, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 735, 750 et seq. (1941); Berle, Non-
cumulative Preferred Stock, 23 Col. L. Rev. 358 (1923). Frey asserts that most of the writers
have approved the dividend credit. 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 735, 753 (1941).
4 Bassett v. United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 668, 7o Atl. 929
(9o8), aff'd 75 N.J. Eq. 539, 73 Atl. 54 (19o9). (A bill to enjoin the corporation from paying
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danger that withheld earnings will be appropriated for the benefit of the com-
mon shareholders. Such appropriation occurs whether the withheld earnings are
directly distributed to common in subsequent years or are retained in the busi-
ness, earning income and providing interest-free leverage for common.s Of
course it is also true that retention of preferred's earnings in some measure
benefits the preferred shareholders themselves, since the increased corporate
capital better insures preferred's receipt of its fixed return. Moreover, where
the withheld sum includes substantial earnings distributable to common and
the dividend credit prevents their distribution before the credit is repaid, the
preferred shareholder will receive the benefits of the withholding while common
bears the major burden. Finally, the market may already have discounted the
risk that common will appropriate earnings withheld from noncumulative pre-
ferred stock, so that adoption of the dividend credit would only create windfall
gains. In the ordinary situation, however, preferred dividends are probably
withheld in years when the common dividend would be insubstantial. The ad-
vantageous position of common with respect to such withheld sums appeared so
inequitable to the New Jersey court that it imposed some of the incidents of
cumulation upon the general noncumulative share agreement when there were
earnings.
The New Jersey dividend credit accrues when earnings are sufficient to allow
dividends on noncumulative preferred stock but are not so distributed. For this
purpose, ho wever, the concept of "earnings" has been limited so as to exclude
various unusual accretions to surplus. 6 The credit is unimpaired so long as the
a dividend to preferred out of surplus, there being no earnings in the year of distribution. The
dividends were paid out of a "reserve for added working capital" which had always been in-
vested in securities. The court held that no actual working capital had been appropriated,
but that a corporate by-law would have allowed that in any case.) Moran v. United States
Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co., 95 N.J. Eq. 389, 123 Atl. 546 (1924), aff'd 96 N.J. Eq. 689,
126 At. 329 (1924). (A bill brought by a common shareholder to enjoin payment of dividends
to preferred in excess of the fixed annual dividend rate. Injunction denied.) Day v. United
States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co., 95 N.J. Eq. 389, 123 Atl. 546 (x924), aff'd 96 N.J. Eq.
736, 126 Atl. 302 (1924). (A bill brought by a preferred shareholder to enjoin payment of
dividends to common while the credit was outstanding. Injunction granted.)
5 The return on preferred stock is fixed, and the previous capital was sufficient to meet that
return. It follows that the return from the additional investment will go to common. The
liquidation value of common, of course, will increase by the amount of the withheld sum. But
appropriation takes place even in the absence of liquidation or dividend disbursement of the
principal sum withheld, since the present value of a sum is equal to the discounted value
of the future increments of income it will yield.
6 This limitation is defined in Dohme v. Pacific Coast Co., 5 N.J. Super. 477, 68 A. 2d 49 0(i949), and Agnew v. American Ice Co., 2 N.J. 291, 66 A. 2d 330 (1949). The Dohme case held
that gains from the corporation's acquisition of its own bonds at a discount were not avail-
able for noncumulative preferred dividends. The Agnew case was also concerned with the prob-
lems of determining whether various accretions to surplus were available for preferred divi-
dends. Thus the New Jersey court has undertaken the very difficult task of classifying accre-
tions to surplus. Under the Dohme case it appears that accretions to surplus not giving rise
to a dividend credit can be distributed to common in a year where there are no distributions to
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earned surplus has remained high enough to cover it,7 and has not been "ap-
plied" to certain "legitimate corporate purposes. ' 8 So long as a dividend credit
exists, no dividends can be paid on common stock9 Any preferred dividends,
not in satisfaction of a dividend credit, but in excess of current earnings are
subtracted from the credit. °
These specialized characteristics of the New Jersey dividend credit underline
the restriction it has undergone since the court first asserted in Day v. United
States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co."',that the only distinction between
cumulative and noncumulative stock lay in cumulative's credit for arrearages
when there were no earnings. Thus in Lich v. United States Rubber Co.2 the
federal district court asserted, by way of dictum, that the credit would be lost
if the surplus were "applied to legitimate corporate purposes such as payment
of debts, reduction of deficits, capital improvements or extensions, and other
ordinary business requirements."1 3 The same language was employed in Dohme
preferred. 63 Harv. L. Rev. 89o, 89I ( 95o), noting Dohme v. Pacific Coast Co., supra. The
New Jersey court was concerned with a problem on the order of the following. If excessive
bad debts reserves had been charged in years when preferred was paid its dividends, income
treatment of a writing down of this reserve in a year when there was no corporate income
would result in appropriating what should have been common earnings in previous years to
preferred in the current year. Thus the Dohme rule is an attempt at a common dividend
credit. The other policy reason behind this attempt at classification is the reluctance to allow
preferred the benefit of gains to surplus which are not connected with the ordinary operations
of a given year (for example, bond retirement at a discount) and a corresponding disinclination
to make preferred bear the greater burden in the event of extraordinary losses (expropriation,
acts of God, etc.) in years where ordinary income is about equal to preferred dividends. Thus,
these items are allowed to be directly transferred to surplus. Agnew v. American Ice Co.,
supra. For an example of the numerous problems arising in this area see Agnew v. American
Ice Co., supra at 65a. Problems existed with reference to depreciation allowances, redemption
of securities, writing off of doubtful accounts, and deduction of "provision for contingencies"
from net income. It should be noted that the New Jersey court has superimposed added
difficulties to the already complex task of defining corporate income. There seems no reason to
discriminate generally between common and preferred in eligibility for receipt of unusual
increments to surplus.
7 Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co., 95 NJ. Eq. 389, 123 Atl. 546
(E924), aff'd 96 N.J. Eq. 736, 126 Atl. 302 (r924).
8 Dohme v. Pacific Coast Company, s N.J. Super. 477, 68 A. 2d 490 (1949). Of course,
technically the surplus is not "applied" to corporate ends. When debts are retired or machinery
purchased, only the form of the assets is changed. Cash may be applied to corporate ends, but
not surplus.
9 Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co., note 7 supra. But consider the
implications of the Dohme rule discussed in note 6. It appears that certain increments to
surplus couldbe distributed to common even in the face of a dividend credit.
00 Agnew v. American Ice Co., 2 N.J. 291, 66 A. 2d 330 (1949).
u96 N.J. Eq. 736, 74 o , 126 A. 2d 302, 304 (1924).
-.39 F. Supp. 675 (N.J., 1941).
13 39 F. Supp. 675, 683 (N.J., 1941). The holding of the Lich case was that a dividend
credit did not accrue in those years in which there were earnings without corporate distribu-
tion, but where a surplus net deficit existed.
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v. Pacific Coast Co.,4 where it was held that repurchase of corporate bonds at a
discount was not one of these ordinary business requirements s Although the
basic argument for the dividend credit persists even where earnings are
"ploughed back" (since common receives the income earned by what amounts
to a forced capital contribution), New Jersey is unwilling to allow the credit
unless those earnings are held in the form of cash, investments in securities or
other uses defined to be outside ordinary business requirements. But since
stockholders may sometimes force dividend distributions by injunction where
earnings can be shown to be withheld without purpose, the dividend credit may
be superfluous in those very instances in which it accrues. Since directors can
usually justify withholdings as necessary to meet possible contingencies, the
dividend credit faces the danger of complete extinction if withholdings to meet
legitimate contingencies are "legitimate corporate purposes" within the mean-
ing of the dicta in the Lick and Dohme cases. While this danger is presently un-
recognized by the New Jersey court, it will present a continual threat as the
court struggles with the problem of drawing the line between ordinary and
extraordinary business uses. In any event, the New Jersey rule has been so nar-
rowed that the Wabask case would be decided identically by the Supreme Court
and by the New Jersey court.16
The apparent disintegration of the New Jersey rule has been both subtle and
inarticulate. In the Cast Iron Pipe cases the withheld dividends were clearly
correlated with an unused reserve for added working capital.17 Consequently no
substantial discussion of "employment for legitimate corporate purposes" ap-
peared, and it was easy to engraft the Lich dictum onto these early cases. The
Dohrne situation was the first to test the Lich doctrine which had declared that
retirement of bonds was an ordinary business activity. Although the court en-
thusiastically embraced the doctrine verbatim, it then decided that retirement
of bonds was not ordinary business activity reducing the dividend credit. The
Lich doctrine is apparently limited to this extent.' 8 More important, however,
the New Jersey court is seemingly unaware that its present distinction is almost
completely irrelevant to the policy of the dividend credit rule. The unhappy
marriage of the dividend credit with the "ordinary business requirement" cri-
teria would have been prevented had the New Jersey court realized that the
14 5 N.J. Super. 477, 68 A. 2d 490 (i949). Similar language appears in Agnew v. American
Ice Co., 2 N.J. 291, 3o3, 66 A. 2d 330, 336 (1949).
xS But note the contradiction this results in. See text at note i8 infra.
16 Among the operative facts of the Wabash case is the employment of the withheld earnings
as working capital.
'7 The same fact situation existed in Cintas v. American Car and Foundry Co., 131 N.J.
Eq. 419, 25 A. 2d 418, aff'd 132 N.J. Eq. 460, 28 A. 2d 53X (1942).
19 Certainly repurchase of corporate bonds is equivalent to "retirement of debt." Compare
5 N.J. Super. 477, 88 A. 2d 490 (i949).
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form of the assets representing withheld earnings has no relation to the equitable
rights of noncumulative shareholders at distribution.'9
But might not a more drastic theory serve to make a dividend credit effec-
tive? For example, what if a cumulative-if-earned theory were adopted whereby
the noncumulative stock would possess the incidents of cumulative except for
the unearned dividend credit?20 The position of a noncumulative shareholder
with a dividend credit would then be identical to that of a cumulative share-
holder with arrearages. Apart from the dicta in the Lich and Dohme cases, the
cumulative-if-earned approach would differ from the New Jersey rule in that
the subsequent level of earned surplus would be immaterial, thus avoiding
needless and arbitrary complexities.
19 The Cast Iron Pipe cases did not face the problem head-on since the earnings there were
so clearly representable in readily available securities. Of course, the creation of added surplus
and the "earning of the earnings" were simultaneous. The association of the earnings with
particular assets implies a nonexistent time sequence. This is not harmful in itself, but makes
much easier a development such as the "ordinary business purpose" doctrine. However, the
quick convertibility of the assets associated with earnings, while emphasized by the Bassett
court, was not decisive there as the lower court points out by way of dictum: "[A]ny amount
taken from actual working capital.., is at once restored to the character it originally had."
Bassett v. United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 668, 7o Atl. 929 (19o8).
The Bassett case is certainly clear where the earnings are "in" securities and where dividends
to common would impair the surplus representing withheld earnings. Judge Learned Hand in
his dissent in the Wabash case, thought that the Bassett case was ambiguous where the working
capital representing earnings is unimpaired, but distributions to common are made from other
sources. Would such distribution be enjoined? Barclay v. Wabash Railway Co., 30 F. 2d 260,
267 et seq. (C.A. 2d, 1929). In view of the Day case it seems this ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of a strict interpretation of the credit. See text at note ii supra. Note that even if
distribution is allowed in the instance cited the book value of the credit remains unimpaired.
It is dubious how much it is worth, however, if it remains sunk in the company while common
continues to receive dividends. Under the analysis of note 5 supra, indefinite retention of the
credited sum would amount to its appropriation for common. Consequently, it must be ad-
mitted that insofar as ambiguity existed the policy of the credit was endangered.
Whatever was true before the Lich case, the Lich, Agnew, and Dohme cases, all decided in
the last decade, clearly distort the rule. Thus the Agnew case states that "dividends earned but
withheld and retained as surplus and not utilized in the business [are subject to the dividend
credit]." Agnew v. American Ice Co., 2 N.J. 291,3o3, 66 A. 2d 33o, 336 (1949). These cases, of
course, all followed the Wabash case. Thus either the New Jersey court has intentionally made
a substantive change in its doctrine, perhaps in the light of that case, or a latent inconsistency
not made clear in the early cases because of their special facts has finally been manifested.
Assuming the latter to Ue true, it is interesting to speculate whether the New Jersey court
would have promulgated _the doctrine if it had fully considered the consequences of its con-
sistent application.
20 Frey, in effect, advocates a cumulative-if-earned rule. See Frey, op. cit. supra, note 3.
Berle, on the other hand, was concerned with segregating part of earned surplus in favor of the
dividend credit. See Berle, op. cit. supra, note 3. Judge Manton appeared to have advocated
a cumulative-if-earned theory in speaking for the circuit court in the Wabash case. Barclay v.
Wabash Railway Co., 3 o F. 2d 260 (C.A. 2d, 1929).
